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The court held that while the deeds express the intent to deliver
to an escrow agent to hold until the deaths of the grantors, no con-
sideration can be given thereto other than to say that these statements
are mere surplusage and cannot nullify the clear purpose of the wife
at the time the deeds were delivered. Light v. Lane, 41 Ind. 539 (1873).
A deed is consummated by the delivery by the grantor and its accept-
ance by the grantee. Harwood v. Masquelette, 95 Ind. App. 338, 181
N.E. 380 (1932); Cassidy v. Ward, 70 Ind. App. 550, 123 N.E. 724
(1919); Sims v. Smith, 99 Ind. 469 (1884). Until delivery these deeds
were merely inoperative scraps of paper. 16 AM. J-OR., DEEDS, § 23, at 450.
Being neither void nor voidable there is no question of ratification or
disaffirmance. It is immaterial how she originally signed, whether
as grantor or releasor, as a married or unmarried woman. At the
time of delivery her former signature was adopted by her as an un-
married woman and as a grantor for the purpose of conveyance.
Sims v. Smith, 99 Ind. 469 (1884); Nye v. Lowry, 82 Ind. 316 (1882).
The date of delivery is the date at which the legal status of the grantor
is to be determined. Harwood v. Masquelette, 95 Ind. App. 338, 181
N.E. 380 (1932); and a deed signed when under a disability is good
if delivered after the disability is removed, the date of delivery being
the date of the transaction. Tested by these rules it is apparent that
the sale of a part of the land between the time the deeds were written
and the time of their delivery by the wife did not destroy the effi-
cacy of the deeds, and the fact that the deeds at delivery included
more real estate than then owned by the grantor did not destroy the
operative effect of the deeds as to the lands owned by the grantor.
16 AM. JUR., DEEDS, §329, at 623.
The decision herein conforms with previous Indiana cases and
is in line with decisions of other jurisdictions on similar facts. Saun-
ders v. Blythe, 112 Mo. 1, 20 S.W. 31R (1892); Doe v. Howland, 8 Cow.
277 (N.Y. 1828); Goodman v. Goodman, 20 Ohio App. 419, 152 N.E.
200 (1926); Jourdan v. Jourdan, 9 S. & R. 268 (Pa. 1823).
TORTS
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Plaintiff's intestate was killed while climbing an unguarded high
tension electrical tower located 1000 feet from a traveled road. Chil-
dren were accustomed to playing in that vicinity, and the jury found
that the child had been actually attracted to the tower. Held, for
plaintiff. Electrical tower was an attractive nuisance. Gillespie v.
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 43 N.E. (2d) 141 (Ill. 1942).
The court in the instant case applied the rule of United Zink Co.,
v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922), which held that for recovery the instru-
mentality must in fact attract the victim on to the premises.
Some authorities have criticised this rule, contending that if for
any reason the occupier of the land knew that children were likely
to trespass and become exposed to a dangerous and attractive device,
then the duty to protect the children arises. Recovery should be
allowed even though the children were not in fact attracted on to the
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premises by the "nuisance." See, HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1938) 593;
at 220; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §339.
Indiana courts have followed the stricter rule and have insisted
that the plaintiff be in fact attracted on to the premises by the in-
strumentality. The "nuisance" is said to create "an implied invitation
by leaving a thing exposed and unguarded which is of such a nature
as to tempt and allure young children." Chicago and Erie R.R. V. Fox,
38 Ind. App. 268, 275, 70 N.E. 81, 84 (1906).
See also Drew -v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N.E. 547 (1932);
Note (1933) 8 IND. L. T. 508; (1925) 36 A.L.R. 28, at 77, 78.
The Indiana courts have found the doctrine inapplicable where
the plaintiff was not in fact attracted by the injurious instrument;
see Holstine v. Director General of R.R., 77 Ind. App. 582, 134 N.E.
303 (1922); (1925) 36 A.L.R. 28, at 78; as the injured "did not dis-
cover such place until after they had themselves become trespassers."
Indianapolis Motor Speedway Co. v. Shoup, 88 Ind. App. 572, 578, 165
N.E. 246, 248 (1929).
However, Indiana by statute has excepted cases involving elec-
tricity from the general rule, and has stipulated "that in the trans-
mission and use of electricity of a dangerous voltage, full and com-
plete insulation shall be provided at all points where the public . . .
are liable to come into contact with the wires." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns,
1933) § 20-304. In these cases anticipation of the danger, rather
than the fact of attraction seems to be the important element. Ft.
Wayne and No. Ind. Traction Co. v. Stark, 74 Ind. App 669, 127 N.E.
460 (1920); Harris v. Indiana Gen'l Service, 206 Ind. 351, 189 N.E.
410 (1934) (but neither case mentioned the statute).
WORKMENS COMPENSATION
ILLEGITIMATE DEPENDENTS
The father of two minor children refused to support them or their
mother. The mother went to live in adultery with the deceased, taking
the children with her. During the five-year period of cohabitation,
the deceased was their only means of support. Upon his death in
an industrial accident, the mother and children applied to the Indus-
trial Board for compensation. The board refused their application
and the children appealed. Held, that the children are entitled to
compensation even though they bore no legal relation to the deceased.,
At common law, illegitimate children were social outcasts; for all
practical purposes the rights and duties of the parent-child relationship
applied only when the relationship was legitimate.2 Even today, this
dogma persists to some extent, as evidenced by statutes pertaining to
deeds and wills.3
1. Russell v. Johnson, -Ind. App.-, 42 N.E. (2d) 392 (1942).
2. Gavit, B1. Comm. (1941) 199; Peck, Domestic Relations (3rd ed.
1930) § 141; Schouler, Domestic Relations (6th ed. 1921) H5 711-
714; Tiffany, Domestic Relations (3d ed. 1921) § 114.
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 6-2309; Gavit, The Indiana Law
of Future Interests, Descent, and Wills (1934) § 143 (f); Vernier
and Churchill, Inheritance by and from Bastards (1935) 20 Iowa
L. Rev. 216 (giving a table of statutes from the various states
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